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The preText: Lacanian Moves of the Real 
Art since the Renaissance has been obsessed with the portrait 
and defined by it as the form of representation made even more 
iconic through the invention of photography where the notion of 
the profile became established as a sign of prosperity, prestige and 
power (Sekula, 1986). This enlightenment tradition of portraiture 
is not likely to perish at any given future date; the digitalization of 
the image continues to make the banal snap-shot proliferate at such 
an incredible rate identifYing the thirst for personal representation 
in contemporary society. The explosion of celebrity magazines, the 
spread of the paparazzi, and the easy access to digital printers should 
give us all the more reason why art educators s,hould re-examine the 
representational value of portraiture as subject matter for the art 
classroom. 
Artists and art educators have always included portraiture as part 
of their curriculum repertoire. It has a long venerable tradition in art 
education since the founding of the Florentine Academy during the 
Renaissance where anatomy and life drawing were first taught. The 
growth of portraiture, of course, reaches its height in Holland with 
such figures as Franz Hals, Rembrandt and Vermeer, where humanism 
takes command, so to speak, as the haute bourgeoisie are able to gain 
economic ground, setting up the first Constitution in 1588 against 
the interests of Church and Aristocracy .. The portrait essentially was 
a representational technology that "stole" the light of God from the 
Church and 'power from the Aristocracy by imbuing the sitter with 
a "unique" subjectivity and importance, as if two subjectivities were 
present: the actual representation of the sitter and his or her "unique" 
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self perceived as the "soul" of the person, an ideal inner self that 
is aligned with God. Vermeer's studio was essentially an inverted 
Cathedral. Hence, the artist was always judged as to whether he (it 
was a male dominated occupation) could capture the "essence" of the 
person through the skill of the hand. The technology of representation: 
the under-painting in grays, the grinding of colored minerals, and 
the glazing techniques with oil paint secularizes "revealed theology" 
as "natural theology" by presenting the tangibility of things. 
This "double" claim of portraiture held up even stronger when 
the bourgeoisie came to power, establishing Nations through 
revolutionary means. The Impressionists readily represented the 
bourgeoisie frolicking along the banks of the Seine through a 
technology that ranged from rapid (Degas, Monet) to slow (Seurat) 
brush strokes, with watercolors, paintings and sketches done en plein 
air rather than necessarily confined to the studio, as empiricism 
reigned supreme. Again, the skill of rendering the portrait, still a 
fascination for tourists who watch sidewalk artists earning their 
keep, was retained. However, the move towards artifice, as in the 
developments of post-Impressionism, already meant a confrontation 
with photography that had begun in 1839 with Daguerre when 
photographic technologies eventually put into question the 
"essential" self as it became increasingly easier to touch up the 
negatives to produce ideal images, a direction which has now lead us 
to the complete manipulation of the digitalized image. 
Since the invention of photography, it is often argued that 
technology of the lens apparatus and printing process changes our 
understanding of what portraiture "is." In a seminal essay, the art 
historian and theorist Rosalind Krauss (1985) argued that "[e]very 
photograph is the result of a physical imprint transferred by light 
reflections onto a ;ensitive su"rface. The photograph is thus a type 
of icon, or visual likeness, which bears an indexical relationship to 
its object" (p.203). She goes on to suggest in the second part of her 
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essay that: 
the effect of the work is that its relation to its subject is that of 
the index, the impression, the trace. The painting is thus a sign 
connected to a referent along a purely physical axis. And this 
indexical quality is precisely the one of photography. (p.215) 
published in 1977, Krauss could not have anticipated that by the turn 
of the century the day of chemical-based technologies would be over 
(except for "purists" who complement those enthusiasts of vintage 
"vinyl" music and analogue synthesizers). "Technically" speaking, 
however, Krauss is entirely right despite this technological change. 
The conventional icon/index that defined duality in photography 
has broken down. But, of course, the iconic portrait continues to 
function in everyday life, otherwise the industrial complex that 
surrounds the reproduction of "family snaps" would collapse-not 
likely to happen given the thirst for "memories" that attempt to 
freeze time as reminders of how we thought we once "were." 
The family "snap" at first glance, seems to preserve the claim that, 
like the former technologies of painting, the "essence" of the person 
photographed is being "caught." The paparazzi photo functions in 
this way as well: the celebrity is "caught" in his or her "natural" state 
of just being "human." Often, this means being caught unaware, 
undressed or in some unflattering pose, just the opposite of the 
artifice or role as a celebrity's mask. Somehow, this is perceived as 
being the "authentic" self In this way the paparazzi "steal" a celebrity's 
jouissance (libidinal vitality) so it can be consumed by a voyeuristic 
public-a rather vampirish act. However, the photographic archive 
that each family or individual member possesses, oddly enough, has 
little do with representation per se. What is this "essence" that seems 
to fade in an age of simulacra? The photographic archive seems to 
point to its "outside," to what cannot be retrieved, to what cannot be 
represented-to the impossibility of time itself It is this impossible 
"trace" that Marianne Hirsch (1997) is able to articulate so well in 
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her Family Frames: Photography, Narrative and Postm em 0 ry. As she 
notes in her opening discussion of Roland Barthes celebrated study 
on photography, Camera Lucida (1981), the one photograph that he 
cherishes and discusses in detail, where he finds not only his mother 
but the qualities of their relationship -a congruence between "my 
mother's being and my grief at her death" (p.70)-is not reproduced 
in his book. For us, as viewers, it would just be another generic family 
photograph from a long time ago. We cannot see the photograph like 
he sees it. It is impossible. Yet, this picture of his mother provoked in 
him a moment of self-recognition. In his reading process, it opened 
up a corridor of time enabling a process of self-discovery, a discovery 
of a self-in-relation to his mother-as his loss and his mourning. 
The photograph "moved" him as it released its frozen moment of 
time down a corridor that seems faster than the speed of light. The 
referent (his mother) haunts him like a ghost, evoking what has now 
become the mainstay of our understanding of what he meant by the 
sting, prick, cut or puncture of the punctum of the photograph. So, 
while there is no doubt that technology changes the way we "see" 
the world through an "inhuman" eye made possible by the machinic 
lenses of the cinematic apparatus, the fundamental question of the 
"impossibility" of representation remains open to question. 
The first part of this essay draws a preText. It draws on 
psychoanalytic theory of Lacan to question the very "possibility" of 
portraiture and to rethink its practice along non-representational 
lines; that is, as a practice of "impossibility" where the failure of 
representation is already presupposed. The second part, which I call 
the text, extends this discussion to Deleuze and his notions of the 
time-image to further the question of grappling with an art practice 
that ruins representation. 
What Barthes' Camera Lucida teaches us (from the spectator side 
in this case) is that the object must "look" back at us if we are to 
meet its gaze. It looks back at us not from its immediate physical 
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location-after all, Barthes came across this particular photograph 
amongst many. But only this one made him hesitate. It shocked him 
immediately. Contemplation occurred only after this initial "punch" 
took place. Rather, the photograph looked back at him from a site 
that cannot be articulated through the cite of language, nor can it be 
seen (sighted). We have to posit a bodily register that exceeds both 
language and representation. For Lacan this is the psychic register 
of the Real, the unconscious, and if we were to give this claim a 
Deleuzean twist, we can call it the brain, a site that can never know 
itself, that can never be entirely transparent to itself, no matter what 
the context is. Some aspect of the brain's functioning will always 
remain mysterious and unknown no matter how sophisticated 
neuroscience might become. And, so it is with the unconscious. 
There is a negativity that pervades all of life-an unknown dimension 
that remains opaque. 
We can now add to this yet another aspect-the virtuality 
of time as a past that always presses on the present, on the actual 
"now." Such a time dimension-in the form of memories, traumas, 
dreams, hallucinations, and above all desire, haunts the register of 
the Real and the affected body. From a Lacanian psychoanalytic 
perspective, when the object "looks" back desire has been created in 
the register of fantasy and impossibility. It was, after all, Barthes loss 
of his mother that prompted his hesitation. Simply put, the object 
of desire is caught up in an unfulfillable (impossible) search for an 
eternally "lost" pleasure-a pleasure referred to as jouissance-when, 
as infants, we become civilized as our bodies become "shaped" by 
cultural discourses and image formations as we slowly enculturate 
to become law biding citizens. Psychoanalytically speaking, aphanisis 
or a fading of the full possibility of the polymorphous sexual subject 
takes place as the infant realizes that the Other (parents and society 
at large) demands and expects certain behaviors of him or her that 
have to be followed. The infant can no longer expect to get every 
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little thing s/he wants. Some pleasure has to be given up-it becomes 
lost in this sense, retrievable only through imaginary fantasy. In a 
phallogocentric society such as ours, to become a speaking subject 
this means the infant must take up either a masculine or feminine 
position usually along biological lines. One must (mistakenly) assume 
that one has the phallus (active) as the abstract symbol of power, or 
one must assume that one is (passive) the phallus. This latter position 
associated with the feminine position, stands in for what masculinity 
desires to feel complete. For Barthes, an openly outed gay who strove 
not to be so positioned by the symbolic order, the desire to recall his 
mother to help restore this lost jouissance was therefore especially 
acute. 
Exploring the Psychic Real 
Let us now look on the painter's side of things rather than 
that of the spectator, to flesh out the claims when explo~ing the 
intricacies between desire, jouissance, memory, time, and the psychic 
register of the Real. In her magnificent study of Rembrandt, whose 
prolific output of self-portraits constitutes and exemplifies the 
artist striving to assert self-reflective individuality so that he might 
improve his status as a miller's son in seventeenth century Holland, 
a country where both Church and Royalty had been displaced by 
an early constitutional government formulated by a moneyed haute 
bourgeoisie, Mieke Bal (1991) writes: 
The self-portrait can become self-reflexive, not because it shows 
us the face we know to belong to the painter, but because 
it stands for the study-for the practice of painting and its 
difficulties ... [T]he self-portrait gains in self-reflexivity when 
the reflection on painting is not signified in the study, in the 
exaltation of the self but in the detail that demonstrates the 
danger to the self .. .. The body at risk is the representation of the 
threat to subjective wholeness that self-reflection poses. (pp. 
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254-255, added emphasis) 
Bal fingers something like Barthes' punctum, but now placed on the 
artist's side. Of the hundreds (should we say thousands?) of portraits 
(paintings and sketches) that Rembrandt did, several stand out that 
mark the trace of this bodily "risk" she identifies. Despite his wealth, 
Rembrandt's life of ostentatious living led to bankruptcy and his life 
was filled with great personal tragedy (only one of his four children 
survived birth and his wife died at the young age of 30). Despite 
this , his artistic output increased, which seems contradictory. Yet, 
it is through artistic work that an artist's symptom separates itself 
from jouissance. The symptoms of Rembrandt's suffering brought on 
by the loss of his three children, wife and fortune, fueled his desire 
as he fell into subjective destitution. "[T]he symptom is jouissance 
as sense enjoyed by a subject, while a piece of [art] work offers a 
sense to be enjoyed by whoever wants to enjoy it ... the condition of 
creation is that the subject realizes that the Other does not exist" (p. 
43), by which Miller (1998), Lacan's brother-in-law and the author 
of this sentence, means that through art the suffering associated 
with jouissance is sublimated. "The Other does not exist" refers to a 
pushing back of the expectations of the symbolic order that position 
and mortify the body in a particular way. There is a certain freeing 
of the self by facing the very void that is the empty center of the 
self, formed by the evacuation or loss of polymorphous sexuality-of 
jouissance. Only when Rembrandt dared to face this abyss within 
himself, brought on by the utter devastation of his psyche through 
those losses-his children, his wife and then his fortune, was he most 
successful in capturing that "danger to the self" which Bal writes 
about. Portraiture no longer is just simply a question of representing 
"subjective wholeness." The representation of such "wholeness" is 
precisely what Lacan meant by his notion that the ego misrecognizes 
(meconniassance) itselF: It is when artists paint or snap portraits 
representationally that they avoid the "work" of being an artist. This 
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"work," as I will come to show at the end of this essay, refers to 
the struggle with non-representation, with the attempt to open up 
realms of the unthought. So, for instance, Rembrandt's reworking 
of the Bible along more secular grounds is yet another indicator of 
his struggle with this "big" Other as represented by the power ?f 
the Church. His secularization of biblical themes raised questions 
concerning official interpretations. Some have argued (Hayes, 1999) 
that the self-portraits of Bernini, Rembrandt's contemporary, equally 
exhibit gazes that are always querulous and indecisive-no longer 
self assured and confident autonomous subjects was the case in their 
predecessors: Alberti, Botticelli, Leonardo, Michelangelo. 
Let me develop a more, perhaps obvious example in the well-
trodden iconography of Modernism that every art teacher knows, 
but now can be read with a twist of Deleuzean-Lacanian theory-
the "expressionist" artistic output of Edvard Munch, the same 
Munch who could not part (easily) with his portraits, who worked 
continuously on some canvases for more than ten years, still feeling 
dissatisfied that the image was finished. Slavoj Zizek (1991) has done 
an excellent expose of how Munch's work embodies the Real, but it 
is Lacan in Seminar XII (I964-65) , known as "Crucial Problems 
for Psychoanalysis" who took the time to analyze in Seminar 12: 
Wednesday 17, March 1965, Munch's celebrated self-portrait The 
Scream. What Lacan demonstrates is usually the very opposite of 
what "seems" representationally to be the case by this 'portrait' of 
Munch in a state of incomprehensible psychic turmoil. It is the 
scream that brings on silence and not the other way around says 
Lacan. The scream he says, "abolishes itself in silence . . . The scream 
is traversed by the space of the silence without dwelling in it; they are 
not linked either by being together or succeeding one another, the 
scream creates the abyss into which silence rushes." This has "already 
happened," he says, "when we see Munch's image." In other words, 
the silence of the scream pierces us right away. Its frozen moment of 
- Impossibility of Portraiture 83 
time is instantaneously released. What remains "stuck in Munch's 
throat," the signification that he is unable to speak, that turns his 
larynx into a pipe, exposing the inherent point of failure (the very 
limit) of subjectivity, is the very ontological gap of Being itself-the 
gaping abyss that forms his mouth in the painting. This, properly 
speaking, is the "work" of portraiture. The subject is the subject of 
representation-of the signifier-precisely because of the status of 
this fundamental void of impossibility, the kernel of the Real that lies 
at the heart of subjectivity itself. This impossible void, nevertheless, 
enables the very )condition of possibility for infinitude of possible 
significations to emerge. As Lacan and Zizek, his best contemporary 
translator show, Munch's Scream makes accessible the impact of 
traumatic experience where we (in Hegelian terms) experience a 
"night of the world"-the "true" condition of the subject where the 
lived coherence and cohesion of the ego in control of reality becomes 
ruptured. The point is that this rupture happens more often than 
we think if we stay tuned to it and "work" through it. This is not 
"therapy" in the traditional sense, but recognition that the work of 
art sublimates the Real, and that there is a certain ethics to both 
viewing and doing such work. In the Freudian tradition working 
through one's aggression, anxiety, angry, envy and so on, creatively, 
provide a distance from these uncontrollable emotional responses. 
Hence, the "ethics of the Real" that is involved requires sensitivity 
to the way we approach such a volatile and potentially destructive 
state of being. 
Text: Deleuzean Moves of the Time-Image 
The enigma of such portraiture, like that of the Mona Lisa's 
smile, rests in this time dimension of the Real. It is this dimension of 
virtual time, a Deleuzean development, and the psychic register of the 
Real, a Lacanian development, which can help art educators rethink 
portraiture in an age of teletechnology where the mediated world of 
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lens technology and the ubiquity of the image seems to promote an 
overlooking of time as memory and the unconscious desire of the 
Real. This is what the next section attempts to do: provide an insight 
to such a possibility. 
In an age of the image society where teletechnological media 
attempt to construct our societal consciousness, this part of the essay 
attempts to help rethink representation's "outside" by drawing now 
on the work of Giles Deleuze to further Lacan by focusing on the 
"portraiture" of Francis Bacon and the "living" monumentalism of 
Jochen Gertz. This move might help us grasp the necessity of ruining 
representation by introducing a much-needed re-conceptualization 
of time and sensation that remains wedded to objects and their 
movements through narration, illustration, and representation. 
The attempt in this part of the essay is to grasp thinking of an art 
education that no longer goes from image to thought, that is from 
percept to concept-such a direction is overwhelming present in 
elementary art education where story telling narratives through 
images is perhaps the quintessential practice in all its possible myriad 
of forms-nor from concept to affect; that is from thought to image, 
which is the polar opposite practice that governs much of junior 
and high school art where self-expressionism still by and large reigns 
supreme and supported by various forms of arts based research 
where the researcher's subjectivity still remains a central concern. 
Exceptions to this set of generalities can dlways be found-but this 
legacy of modernism continues to linger in our schools despite the 
rhetoric that there are inroads being made towards teaching more 
contemporary art forms like performance art, installation, and 
conceptualism-all three of which, provide a way to surpass the above 
stated bifurcated dialectic. 
Performance art, installation and conceptual art are three forms 
that begin to deconstruct representation a~ such. In these forms, time 
has been pulled away from an action-image dominated by movement 
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(gesture) and explored as an entity in itself, and not attached to an 
object as famously developed in the early modernism by cubists and 
futurists. Performance art gives us time taken away from movement, 
often disembodying the voice and repeating movement through 
various forms of automation; conceptual art gives us thought 
immanent to the image, while installation art gives us conceptual 
time-space in which the body must relate to in new ways. In all three 
art forms, the event as a problematic comes to us from the "outside" 
- not in our comprehension or control. 
To go beyond this stated bifurcation, we take the Deleuzean 
path where concept and image are one. As Deleuze (1989) puts it, 
"The concept is in itself in the image, and the image is for itself 
the concept. This is no longer organic and pathetic but dramatic, 
pragmatic, praxis, or action thought" (p. 161). To state this proposed 
trajectory as succinctly and forcefully as possible, an art education that 
is "fit" for contemporary society must move away from its emphasis 
on the "still" image and the action narrative, even that of journalistic 
photography where time is still governed by movement and space, 
and begin to identify the way time itself, in the current forms of the 
moving image of the new media, is being explored through "new 
lines of flight" that encompass virtual forms of presentation. This 
is where Nietzschean necessity of entertaining the "powers of the 
false," a positive sense oflying (see Deleuze, 1989, chapter 5) becomes 
important since we no longer live in a society where fact and fiction 
can be distinguished from one another. Simulacra and the decentering 
of the faith and belief in the documentary (especially the factual 
claims of news) as just another form of construction necessitates 
that art educators rethink our teaching positions, which generally 
remain fixated by the "-isms" of modernism because they are easily 
categorized and can be taught as distinct movements, and especially 
because they appeal to the school curricula structures with their well-
ordered buzzer blocked times of so many minutes. A different order 
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of understanding of the body, offered by some forms of time-cinema, 
installation art and performance, provide a change in perception that 
identifies a body of dispersed sensations that is being technologized 
and targeted as separate organs. The tension between the cyborgian 
body of technology and what William Gibson and sci-fi fans call 
"meat" is part of this identifiable gap-the gap between living "flesh" 
and dead "meat" which refuses to become entirely absorbed into the 
machine. 
From a Deleuzian perspective a very different notion of the 
subject emerges, a subject not so much in control of its environment 
as an agent, but · also not a subject who is entirely controlled by 
the institutional agencies (Le., by Foucault's understanding of 
governmentalities). His is not a body in the usual phenomenological 
sense as theorized by Husserl and then entertained by a long line 
of aestheticians starting from Merleau-Ponty and Mikel Dufrenne, 
but a body "before discourse, before words, before the naming 
of things" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983, p. 38), which reiterates a 
similar distinction Lyotard (1971) makes between the figure and the 
figural. 
This view disrupts the usual seamless narratological arts based 
research and self-expressionistic works that are the order of the day. 
In this view, the image is unhinged from the body as well as reality. 
The subject to the body is reversed where the synthetic apperception 
I 
of I-Me-present-to-itself becomes undone. Especially with cinema 
"the image no longer derives from perceiving (sleeping, memorizing 
... ) body, nor from a rain-archive of data; the image sets the subject 
adrift, sucking it into a trans perceptive and ' falsifying world.' 
Thought becomes immanent to the image (Deleuze, 1989, p. 173). 
"Depth of field is no longer understood in relation to obstacles and 
the concealment of things ... as in Euclidian perspective.: .. but in 
relation to a light which makes us see beings and objects according to 
their opacity" (Deleuze 1989, p. 176). Thought becomes immanent 
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to the image. And, of course, this is one of the foundational ideas of 
conceptual art. We can apply this to the three art forms mentioned 
earlier. With installation art, the viewer is forced to piece a disjointed 
narrative together by him or herself, as the installation holds 
the "secret" of what is trying to be "shown" by not revealing nor 
reveling in its obviousness. Performance, which is just the opposite 
of conceptual art, attempts to introduce the body "Real" into 
movement by staging its event in such a way that its perception by 
spectators is duly "hesitated," in the sense of time as duree, forcing 
estrangement and thus reflexion. Finally, with Conceptual Art, the 
force is to recognize art as an Idea where an anti-aesthetic approach 
requires that the witness (or artist) explicate to him or herself what 
the work is about. Time here is "hesitated" as well since, with some 
conceptual pieces, the viewer may never "get" it. The anti-narrative 
may never emerge. 
Although these remarks may appear enigmatic because of the 
complexity of the contemporary shifts by artists to grasp anti-
humanist notions of the self, I will begin by discussing one work 
of Francis Bacon as an artist who stood on the threshold between 
movement image and the time-image ... still working with a "still" 
image but making it move, and one work by the Jochen Gertz, a 
conceptual artist whose "work" does away with representation, 
certainly not meant as a mere drift into abstraction or its variants. 
These two arts should help to articulate these somewhat troublesome 
theoretical musings. 
Francis Bacon: Nowhere Space and Time (Non-Euclidian Space) 
Bacon can be considered as the exemplary portrait artist in 
terms of emphasizing the psychic register of the Real as theorized by 
Lacan and exemplifying the time-image as contemplated by Deleuze. 
Deleuze (2004) has written a very important book exemplifying 
Bacon's attempt to explore the body of the "flesh," that is, the body of 
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sensation, what Deleuze and Guattari (1983) named (after Antonin 
Artaud) the "body without organs" (BwO). Sensation is no longer 
thought representationally-as the sense of stirring the emotions 
of the viewer-but in the sense of the consciousness of perceiving 
itself This is not phenomenological for there is no "intent" by the 
consciousness for an object, which would plunge us back again into 
representation. While much can be said about Bacon, the approach 
here is to discuss his theory of affective embodiment by examining 
just one of his many works: Triptych May-June 1973. Since copyright 
laws are always problematic there is an excellent Bacon online site 
(http://www.francis-bacon.cx/) that lists his works chronologically. I 
encourage the reader to look up this particular work before reading 
ahead. 
The first thing to note about Bacon is that many of his 
painting are composed as triptYchs, which seem to lend themselves 
immediately to narrative representation. It is precisely such narrative 
representation of the movement image that is being deconstructed 
and the time of the gaps existing in the Real between the three frames 
that are being engaged, implicating the viewer to "figure" it out this 
"other" space-time dimension. Sometimes two or more characters 
(figures) are placed in the same space, which suggests an interaction 
between them as if they are caught in the middle of an act, even 
when this act seems stilled (sleeping, sitting, lying around, waiting). 
Time is introduced into his paintings through a "rough" style of 
paint application to the figures (especially the heads and bodies). 
Heads and bodies appear to be in constant motion, as if the body is 
constantly flowing and shifting. This movement, however, is non-
narratological. Something always "seems" to be going on, but the 
viewer is unable to piece together some coherent story between the 
three frames. Further, the figures are often enclosed in a translucent 
surround by means of circles, parallelepipeds, or frames within the 
canvas-as if there is a proximal distance between inside and outside 
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of the body that is constantly being imperceptibly exchanged. 
Triptych May-June 1973 shows a single subject performing a 
sequence of actions in a bathroom. Two doorways on opposite walls 
frame the figure. In western perception, text is read left to right. 
It appears at first glance that Bacon attempts often to consciously 
reverse this taken-for-granted perception by forcing the viewer to 
read right to left. The right panel depicts a naked man vomiting 
into a bathroom sink. He then crosses the room (middle panel) and 
sits on a toilet (left panel), as if he is dead or keeled over. His face 
is buried in his hands. Hands and face form one big mass. Such 
would be a "normative" reading of the work. On closer inspection 
however, such a reading is put into serious doubt. When one focuses 
on the details another more striking problematic emerges. The light 
switch on the left panel is repeated on the right panel, but is has now 
"moved" to the other door! The doorjamb that frames the figure is 
depicted frontally in the center panel but the angle of the doorjambs 
on the left panel is painted from a slight movement to the right 
showing a bit of the left door, while in the right panel the doorjambs 
have been painted from a slightly left perspective showing slightly 
the perspective of the right door. So the left and right panel seems to 
be mirror opposites. The viewer now cannot read the narrative from 
right to left nor left to right, but is positioned on the center panel. 
Bacon is not illustrating an action sequence, a movement image. 
He is conceptualizing something more profound by the implication 
of time that is being introduced. A light bulb appea'rs in the central 
panel, which is obviously missing in the left and right panels. The light-
switch is also absent in the central panel. In this new subject position, 
the viewer must begin to read these panels as to their symmetry or 
comparability. On both the left and right panels the body is clearly 
in pain-excreting abject bodily fluids: shit and vomit. As reversals 
these panels present us with two holes-the asshole and the mouth 
hole; the ass-mouth connection form a "desiring machine" in Deleuze 
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and Guattari's (1983) terms. The central panel adds to the clue. 
What is striking in this panel is the shadow that is coming out of the 
doorway. Clearly, this is not a "naturalistic" shadow, a representation 
of the figure, but "the night of the world" to use Hegel's phrase again. 
It is amorphous, having vampire-bat like qualities-what Deleuze 
and Guattari would name as "becoming-animal." As a body fluid, 
this shadow seems more viscose-thicker and more substantial than 
the figure who seems rather insubstantial. As if the shadow that flows 
from his body is more overwhelming, draining him so that he only 
appears as a corpse, making him the ghost of the shadow, reversing 
the usual understanding of shadow and its object. Something in the 
body is afflicting the subject. The body Real-the suffering of physic 
pain is being juxtaposed to its externalization as abjected bodily 
fluids made possible through the ass-mouth assemblage machine. 
The physical excesses of the body are compared to the shadow-Thing 
that is overwhelming him. Hence, there is a similarity between all 
three events, held in the way Bacon has presented us with the body 
of sensation through representation that has reversed substantiality 
and its void, the kernel of our unconscious Real. 
Jochen Gertz: The Disappearance of the Object 
Jochen Gertz is an artist, but an artist who does not draw, paint 
or sculpt! Further, he does not create objects in the usual sense of the 
term, nor is there anything to "see" in the usual way art education 
has treated sight. He might be called a portrait artist since the "work" 
of his art grapples with memory, namely monuments as "time that 
is out of joint." The idea of a monument is perhaps the apotheosis 
of what it means to remain in the realm of representation. The 
traditional purposes of a monument is to function like a stele, a 
beacon, to etch the memory into the most permanent and durable 
of materials-marble, stone, steel, bronze. Monuments are meant to 
center a community to a memory. All such commemoration leads to, 
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more or less, religious communion. It endorses an official memory to 
perpetuate a past recollection. Monuments act like banks-time and 
memory are locked into a social space like a vault, trapped as it were, 
into a permanent reminder. 
Gertz is interested in the "other" of such memorializing, to 
awaken the forgetting that haunts every memorial of its permanency 
as it rusts, decays or is simply forgotten. His invisible monuments 
have a peculiar force to exhibiting what you are not supposed to 
see-the haunt of the Real. They make the spectator "see" what 
cannot be seen. They make the "visible" arise where it is lacking-to 
exhibit the time of absence of bodies and the memory gaps that are 
kept out of the perceptual space of representation. Their character is 
not "to say," but to assert what cannot be said, the absent in the field 
of the visible. Like The Scream, these monuments plant a "bone in 
the throat," so that their silence pierces that which is not being heard 
nor recollected. It forces the spectator to become a witness to that 
which is anamorphic to the monument itself Gertz's works initiate 
a transfer of memory into the viewer's living memory, conveying the 
dead recollections of the monuments that usually mortify memory. 
Gertz by doing the "proper" work of art, once again releases time. 
Although there are many examples in his oeuvre that continually 
demonstrate this uncanniness, let me take one: The Anti-Fascist 
Memorial in Hamburg (Das Hamburger Mahnmal gegen Faschismus) , 
collaborated with his wife Esther Shavlev, and unveiled in Oct. 1986. 
(Again, I encourage the reader to google him- http://de.wikipedia. 
org/wiki/Jochen_Gerz). The monument is a square column-40 feet 
high by three feet on each of its 4 sides. It was entirely wrapped 
with sheets of black lead. A sign in eight different languages was 
fixed to a nearby wall where spectators could read and then leave 
their signatures and thoughts on the omonument by carving in the 
lead with the help of stilettos provided. (Some blasted the column 
with their shotguns, leaving their pellet marks of hate!) This phallic 
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column was meant to sink into the ground about six feet per year 
enabling inscribers to access its very peak. By Nov. 1993, five years 
later, it had completely vanished into the ground, becoming invisible. 
Only its flat top appeared at street level as a pavement stone covered 
by a glass plate as if to say that this is Germany's foundation. The sign 
for the instructions had appropriately ended with: "Since nothing 
can stand up for us against injustice." Gertz's conceptual monument 
changed its identity with the time of its movement to the point of its 
de-erection. No longer a souvenir, it became a memorial to the holes 
in memory, a memorial to oblivion, loss, absence and to the actual 
facts - all aspects of the Real. His "work" addresses the problem of 
representation by creating a screen to the effects of the Real. It is a 
non-specular resemblance, meta-mimetic in the way representation 
is erased through the time of its disappearance. 
The "Work" of Art 
The notion of "work" has emerged "time and time" again 
throughout this essay to suggest that the "work" of self-portraiture 
tackles the void of the Self in the register of the Real. This is the 
place of "becoming," as the consciousness of perceiving itself. This 
is where the difficulty of art lies, the difficulty that emerges when 
working in a world of the aestheticized image that surrounds us 
through the screen images of telematic technologies. Representation 
is not life. Representation cannot preserve life. It can only expose 
its undoing, not as the essence of life, but as death. Death, like the 
inevitable butterfly that is chloroformed and pinned in order to be 
studied through the microscope. If life is not to be shown to be just 
represent~tion, as so many structuralist theories tend to do, then the 
dimension of virtual time in the psychic register of the Real has to 
be engaged in as in the "works" of artists like Gertz, Munch, Bacon. 
They reveal a dimension of becoming that forms the gaps of the 
seamless narrative we tell ourselves, the narrative of representation 
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that forgets the unthought-the "work" of creativity. 
This to suggest that art education much engage the affective body 
(BwO) at the level, paradoxically that is "beyond" representation, 
not a easy task in a designer capitalist world where it is the business 
of the neo-capitalist enterprise to reproduce an aestheticized world of 
consumerable images. I recall seeing Alfredo Jaar's installation called 
Geography = W'llr, 1990, I believe it was at the Venice Biennale but I am 
not sure, where the "secret" of the work was revealed to me only after 
I entered the darkened room and tried to figure out just what was 
being shown-it was like a rebus puzzle. The installation consisted of 
a series of photograph-bearing light boxes that hung over six water-
filled oil drums tightly packed together 3X3, the photos reflecting on 
the surface. I could blow on the water and make each one quiver, and 
also see my silhouette as a reflection when I peered over to look at the 
photos. One of the images that quivered in the water showed several 
people in hazmat suits investigating what looked like a dumpsite. 
Another image that reflected on the floating pool was a man holding 
his hands to his face. I soon realized that this was about corporate 
exploitation and expropriation not only of Nigeria's natural exports, 
such as oil, but also the use of Nigeria as a dumpling ground for 
toxic industrial waste by US and Europe. Jaar's light boxes reverse 
the usual advertised goods by projecting Nigerian people suffering 
from this capitalist exploitation, and we the viewers are potentially 
implicated, symbolically shown when we stare into the barrel to see 
the sights of devastation. 
This essay points to the task at hand if a political and ethical 
engagement of the world by our art students is to be maintained, but 
does not offer some sort of definitive curriculum. It suggests a change 
to installation, performance, time-based imagery, and conceptual 
art, which offers the possibility of such a direction. I believe these 
arts offer the power of a self-refleXion, where the core of the self 
as BwO is disturbed as an affective neurological level as marked by 
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the "X." In the past, the field of art education has tended to follow 
(albeit belatedly) the trends of contemporary art-theoretically and 
stylistically. There are no guarantees that the field of education, which 
is continually seduced by representational images, will engage such a 
possibility. Is it even possible in overcrowded schools that are perhaps 
structured to prevent such awareness? "Time" will tell. 1 
1 I would like to thank Olivia Gude for her suggestions when rewriting this essay. 
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